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Power Relations, Coalitions, and Rent Control:
Reforming The Military’s Natural Resource Levies
Collin Grimes and David Pion-Berlin
A fault line in the often-tense domestic politics of post-authoritarian states is the issue of
eliminating compulsory contributions to armed forces revenue that are imposed upon
natural resource producers. The levies, often extracted from export earnings, provide the
armed forces with sizeable off-budget revenue, the allocation of which is not transparent
and not subject to civilian authorization, oversight, or scrutiny. This reduces the
government’s leverage vis-a-vis the armed forces by blunting the impact of withholding
or augmenting defense budgetary allotments, while at the same time enhancing the
military’s autonomy and, indeed, its ability to ignore civilian authorities altogether when
it comes to ﬁscal affairs. This has consequences not only for civilian control over the
military, but also for distributional tradeoffs between defense and social spending on
health and education. These secretive levies can also be unsettling to neighboring states
who may feel threatened by the lack of information on the funds and how they are being
spent.1
Military levies are a global issue, spanning four continents and ten nations. Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Indonesia, Myanmar, Armenia, Chad, and Nigeria
have imposed military levies, with the success of efforts to overturn them varying across
time and space. This is an important distributional struggle in countries where natural
resource export earnings are often the main source of government income,2 and from
which militaries derive large amounts of revenue. For example, in Ecuador, oil revenue
comprised 10 percent of the military’s budget in 2003 and 2004 despite low oil prices.3
Between 2000 and 2016, copper revenue averaged 29 percent of the military budget in
Chile, peaking at 53 percent in 2006.4
Despite their apparent importance, there has been little systematic comparative,
empirical analysis of these taxes and the political efforts to repeal them, even as demand
by civil-military scholars for studies in the political economy of civil-military relations
has increased with Third Wave democratization.5 Why do some countries successfully
reduce or eliminate these levies while others fail?
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This article argues that differing conﬁgurations of relative civilian and military
coalitional strength contribute to the divergent outcomes. Neither civilians in
government nor military elites can act alone to transform their interests into policy.
As with all would-be change agents and status quo defenders, their success depends
crucially on the strength of their alliances. In the contest to shape legislative outcomes in
their favor, each side beneﬁts from the convergence of their positions and those of
potential allies within parties, the congress, and/or the executive branch. When civilian
coalitions are stronger, levy reform becomes possible; when military coalitions have the
advantage, levy reform is stalled.
Which side emerges with the more formidable coalition depends on several factors.
In a democratic era, not all militaries can rely on praetorian pressures to get the policies
they desire. They must count on closer links with political parties, and not all are either
willing or able to so align. Parties that have an afﬁnity for the armed forces must at
the same time see an electoral advantage or at the very least no electoral disadvantage
to pushing for measures that would enhance military revenues at the expense of
governmental leverage. Then they must ﬁnd the votes needed to prevail in the congress.
So too must the incumbent president on the civilian side, who attempts to enlist her
party’s support in the congress to achieve either simple or qualiﬁed majorities. Short of
the necessary votes, that same party will have to widen its scope of support by forging
alliances with other parties, and the ability to do so is affected by the degree of party
fragmentation in the political system. These coalitional battles will be analyzed through
a comparative study of Ecuador and Chile.
Why Do Resource Levies Matter?
A combative issue in numerous countries is the abolition of the required contributions to
armed forces revenue that are imposed upon oil, gas, and mineral producers. The levies
protect the military’s ﬁnancing in an environment of competing claims on scarce
resources by locking in its entitlement to public funds. Since the revenue is off-budget,
the expenditures are seldom accountable to government oversight, much less to the
public or international community.
Natural resource levies that help ﬁnance militaries have implications for democratic
civilian control and governance, ﬁscal policy, socio-economic development, and
regional security. Their analysis lies at the intersection of civil-military relations,
political economy, and peace and security studies. First, because natural resource levies
generate off-budget revenue, they enhance military autonomy and diminish govern-
mental control of the budget. Revenue from the levies grows the military’s ability to
self-fund, while undercutting the government’s power-of-the-purse. This directly
translates into a loss of civilian control, as policymakers’ ability to use the ofﬁcial
budget as a form of leverage over the armed forces is diminished, even nulliﬁed.
Second, levies for militaries undermine a nation’s pursuit of its ﬁscal policy goals.
Select natural resource producers must pay a ﬁxed share of their export revenues to a
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fund, with the transfer sum varying with changes in production levels and international
commodity prices.6 Countries may be forced to set a ﬂoor to annual transfers,
guaranteeing the armed forces a steady ﬂow of income that withstands the instability
associated with the ebb and ﬂow of the market. While reassuring to the military, this
hurts policymakers who want and need greater ﬁscal ﬂexibility to either reduce military
expenditures, help stem inﬂation and balance the budget, or shift budgetary resources to
non-defense-related areas that could generate more employment.7 Policymakers need
annual, discretionary capabilities to make ﬁscal decisions based on macro-economic
criteria, and not to be locked in by immutable transfer sums.
Third, there are longer-term development priorities to consider. For one, revenue
diverted from enterprises to the military cannot be reinvested in the enterprises
themselves, regardless of the economic condition or strategic or national importance of
the ﬁrms. For another, once transferred, the revenue can lose its social value quickly.
Where resources are scarce, a peso spent on military armaments could mean one less
peso spent more wisely on poverty alleviation.8 In a classic “guns vs. butter” tradeoff,
important social programs could lose out to foreign arms purchases facilitated by ample
revenue from natural resource levies.
Military levies impact security relations by creating uncertainty among rival states.
Because so much of the tax transfer process is undisclosed, other states are in the dark as
to exactly how much revenue is being generated and how much has accumulated,
let alone how the funds are being spent.9 Neighboring states that have had conﬂicts in
the past want reassurances regarding defense expenditures in order to avoid security
dilemmas that lead to arms races in the future. In fact, in parts of Latin America,
countries are attempting to trade in hostilities for security cooperation that has been
solidiﬁed through ever deepening budgetary transparency and information exchange.10
This has helped resolve many border disputes, including those which drove military
levies in the ﬁrst place as mechanisms used to project military capacity and instill
uncertainty among rivals. As geo-political threats are abated, the justiﬁcation for
military levies should weaken. In short, inquiries into military levies have wider
implications that should animate scholarship in several subﬁelds.
Take political economy, for example. In recent decades, greater interest has been
generated in the political economy of civil-military relations, as analysts are
increasingly asked to “rethink the relationship between military and economy.”11 This
is because the tensions, cleavages, and alliances surrounding military political
economics can alter the distribution of power, while military economic interests shape
military behavior, affecting not only military professionalism, but also democracy and
the economy.12 In this political economy-centered view of soldier-politician relations,
military levies are uniquely vexing because they can undermine development,
democratic control, ﬁscal responsibility, and security while proving remarkably
resistant to change.13
Analyses of military levies also shed light on the political economy of entitlement
reform. Like pensions and welfare, military levies are an entitlement. Curtailing such
entitlements legislatively requires overcoming the opposition of powerful vested
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interests. Yet those who would reform the military levy face distinct challenges that
stem from limits to transparency and information. Legislative actors, driven to
maximize political and electoral dividends, want some certainty about the impact of
reforms before they throw their support behind them. Less is known about the impact of
abolishing the military levy, however. The payments are off-budget, bureaucratic
reluctance to divulge information is magniﬁed due to security concerns, and there are
few civilian experts or groups to turn to for counsel because the military has a near
monopoly on expertise and information within the defense ministry (and may use
secrecy laws to withhold it). Ultimately, this lack of transparency makes it harder to
build the support needed to defeat opposition, even if the political process is otherwise
the same as that of curbing other entitlements.14
In sum, Alfred Stepan’s claim made thirty years ago regarding debate over military
industry reform holds true in the contemporary debate over military levy reform: “It
becomes an issue that requires separate analytic and political attention.”15 However,
despite all of this, there has been little systematic empirical analysis of military levies
and reform efforts. In this article, we begin to rectify this shortcoming in the literature.
Civil-Military Power Relations in Emerging Democracies
Militaries stand to reap exorbitant sums from natural resource levies and thus cling
tenaciously to their continuation. Civilians who want to reduce or eliminate the levies
will inevitably come up against military resistance, sparking a power struggle. Power is
well-known to civil-military relations scholars, whose “dominant approaches . . . have
pointed to crucial relations of power between civilian and military actors.”16 In the Latin
American past, power was expressed as an unfettered zero-sum contest,17 with groups
confronting each other nakedly without regard for rules of the game. The military used
to win those power contests, inevitably giving rise to disturbing forms of intervention,
up to and including coup d’e´tats.18 In the contemporary democratic period, military
praetorianism is less common because the armed forces cannot easily afford to disregard
democratic norms of behavior by running roughshod over legitimately elected
politicians or the institutions they serve. They risk losing respect, not to mention
resources, to other competing groups in an era when politicians, minding their electoral
fortunes and careers, care much less about defense than about economic development,
poverty, and education. As Wendy Hunter persuasively argued in her book, Eroding
Military Inﬂuence in Brazil, self-interest motivates politicians to stand up to the military
where doing so is vital to securing resources necessary to please their constituents.19
In the contemporary era, civil-military power struggles increasingly occur within
democratic settings. Informally, the armed forces must ﬁnd non-coercive ways of
widening their support and have no choice but to elicit the cooperation of civilians who
are critical to the legislative crafting of policies that affect their vital interests.20 Power
relations during open parliamentary debate are not the simple byproduct of latent
inﬂuences dating back to the military’s control over the democratic transition.21 As the
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impact of a transition weakens over time, the advantages gained by the military during
the tenuous early democratic period—when institutions were fragile and the rules of the
game not yet established—diminish.22 As democratic norms take over and solidify,
politicians, political parties, and congresses are strengthened while the politics of
intimidation (coercion, threats, etc.) become less tenable. The armed forces can no
longer rely on their own institutional power; without the aid of others, including
executive branch allies, lobbyists, and, most of all, political parties within the congress,
their clout will dissipate. At the same time, they cannot be seen openly and formally
courting parties, since they are bureaucratically beholden to the executive branch and its
chain of command. Accordingly, the military has to be discreet and will pin its fortunes
on the prospect that political parties and other political actors will adopt positions which
converge with its own.
Likewise, civilians cannot take their own political power for granted.23 Political
capital notwithstanding, presidents cannot assume their party and party allies will fall
faithfully in line with their policy preferences. Party fragmentation may render true
civilian coalescence very difﬁcult. The more political parties there are in congress, the
harder it is for political leaders to cultivate alliances of different parties. Multipartism
creates more competing demands that political agents must satisfy, as well as greater
potential for unyielding differences in ideology and discipline. Moreover, a segment of
the party establishment may align with the military, thereby weakening the incumbent’s
grip on erstwhile party allies or potential allies. Thus, the president must attempt to craft
a solid coalition of his own if his policy preferences are to prevail.
Coalition Formation under Multiparty Presidentialism
Coalitions play a hero’s role in legislative relations in multiparty presidential regimes. In
such systems, parties are less likely to enjoy a majority in the legislature, prompting
government and opposition alike to search for votes from outsiders.24 Yet neither
president nor opposition can take backers for granted, as different parties have different
political and programmatic interests and may see no beneﬁt to helping others.
Assembling and then cultivating interparty coalitions in the legislature mitigates the
problem.25 Multiparty coalitions internalize disputes and facilitate the creation of clear,
coherent, encompassing legislative agendas, then coordinate the joint action of distinct
legislative constituencies. These coalitions transcend differences and behave like they
are single, catch-all parties.
Of course, viable multiparty coalitions do not emerge everywhere. Successful
arrangements tend to arise where parties are disciplined and there is ideological afﬁnity
between one internal faction and another.26 Ideological compatibility (not sameness)
reduces the political and electoral costs of entering relationships, while unity from
partner to partner holds alliances together once they have begun to emerge. Both
Chilean coalitions—the leftist, civilian-allied Concertacio´n and rightwing, military-
linked Alianza—are “connected” coalitions, as they consist of parties with contiguous
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ideological positions.27 Additionally, the members of the parties in the two blocs vote
together, with coalition membership dictating policy choice. There is little overlap in
preferences between the coalitions.28 As a result, Chile has for decades been argued to
be a de facto two-party system.29
Coalition formation is less successful, and legislative voting less reliable, where
ideology and discipline vary more from group to group. To create workable
arrangements in these conditions, leaders must often reconcile radically opposing
views and absorb the political and electoral costs. Coalitions are fragile and ﬂeeting
where they do materialize. Member parties more readily abandon coalition leaders on
key votes, or abscond from the bloc altogether. Coalition brokers must continually
attract distant new partners, while ensuring that their vital horse-trading does not induce
the desertion of other, often weakly-committed actors. In Ecuador from 1979 to 2008,
where a dozen far-ﬂung parties regularly fought for seats, lack of discipline and
polarization profoundly affected elite behavior and strategies.30 To the extent that
merely “gathering legislative support was the nightmare of every Ecuadorian president,”
forging stable multiparty coalitional arrangements was even more elusive.31
Method and Cases
This study of military levy reform efforts deploys process tracing within the framework
of a small-n comparative analysis. We have selected two “most similar” cases, where
values on the independent variable, coalitional strength, differed dramatically. In
Ecuador (1979–2008), the military coalition failed to develop and the levy reform effort
succeeded while in Chile (1990-present), the pro-military coalition held together and the
levy reform effort failed. These two South American cases match other variables that
may have plausibly inﬂuenced the outcomes. The Ecuadorian and Chilean militaries
have long been considered two of the most politically powerful institutions in South
America. Both countries had bouts with authoritarian rule, where the armed forces
emerged from ofﬁce in strong positions, having presided over economic gains. As a
result, the militaries were able to exert great inﬂuence over the transitions and beyond.
They also retained large natural resource rents and lavish budgets in economies that
were similar in that they were reliant on natural resource production and exports.
While the most similar systems design allows us to identify a causal candidate
(coalitional strength) for levy reform or failure, it goes no further. To establish whether
differences in coalitional strength actually shaped military levy reform outcomes, we used
within-case process tracing, identifying a continuous chain of events, building sequential
and contiguous developments into an explanatory narrative.32 This is an exercise in
"ﬂeshing out a causal story . . . linking cause and outcome in a series of interlocking and
interacting parts."33 The Chilean narrative traces the intermediate steps between the
original formation of the pro-military coalition and the persistence of the Copper Law.
The Ecuadorian narrative traces the steps between the military’s failure to develop party
alliances in the face of successful civilian efforts to do so with the defeat of the oil levy in
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2008. Qualitative data were gathered and triangulated from newspapers and periodicals,
reference materials, government and NGO documents, and academic secondary sources.
Ecuador
In Ecuador, the military has retained outsized inﬂuence in the years since the democratic
transition in 1979. For decades, the armed forces appeared to be the dominant economic
actor, with dozens of enterprises, large oil rents, and lavish budgets at their disposal. In
1989, ten years after the ﬁrst civilian president had “agreed to guarantee the armed forces
the institutional autonomy that civilian leaders had repeatedly denied and that the military
now viewed as a precondition for their withdrawal,” two 1970 Supreme Decrees
underpinning the military’s oil levy were embedded in the 1989 PETROECUADOR
law.34 One provision forced the transfer of 8 percent of oil export revenues to the military,
while the second required the state to divert almost 50 percent of the royalties from
PETROECUADOR-Texaco. For years, democratic governments could not reduce
prerogatives like these because attacks on military interests would likely be met with
intervention. As Anita Isaacs observed: “Just as oil provided a powerful inducement to
intervene in 1972, the fact that the military now has greater institutional interests at stake,
and can justify the defense of those interests in terms of the national interest, may
ultimately place civilian rule at more serious risk.”35 Nonetheless, in 2008, leaders
succeeded where their predecessors had failed: they terminated the military’s oil levy.
Unlike before de facto rule, the armed forces did not try to elicit the cooperation of
parties upon retreating to the barracks. Prior to 1972, they had allied themselves with the
Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano (PLRE), one of two vehicles representing Ecuador’s
elite. The post-1978 system, however, was formed by splits away from the two main parties,
who had fallen victim to personal rivalries and ideological ﬁssions.36 Further, identifying
with the parties did not come naturally to a military that had deﬁned itself politically in
opposition to them.37 Instead, the military armed itself with executive defense ofﬁcials.
Before leaving power, it had amended the presidential charter to reserve the defense
portfolio for the highest-ranking ofﬁcer and thus maintained a cabinet presence that
amounted to a safeguard designed to protect institutional autonomy.38 Military defense
ministers enjoyed statutory authority and an agenda-setting role. Until 1998, military
defense ministers also had control over discretionary expenditures that served to buy the
loyalties of legislators and facilitate the approval of the budget.39 Equally vital was the threat
of force itself. Disapproval was voiced in the streets, as in the 1990s when armed leaders
mobilized their units to Quito’s avenues to rattle sabers in opposition to privatization plans.
Meanwhile, civilian executives fought unsuccessfully to bolster their legislative
hand. The president’s party never won more than a plurality of seats due to
fragmentation of the vote across a dozen relevant parties (in 1995 Ecuador had 6.6
effective parties). Alliance politics thus became central to passing reforms, with a
working coalition often requiring more than two parties. Yet vast ideological distance
spanned across the left- and rightmost parties, and the parties scattered in between were
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minimally connected. The division of seats across so many disparate groups ruled out
ideological compatibility between coalition partners.40 Moreover, deputies from rightist
and critical “swing” centrist and populist parties operated with few constraints.41 Party
leaders often lacked electoral or legislative leverage over the rank-and-ﬁle, while elite
struggles inside parties routinely led to dissident factions defecting from the party on
key votes, or peeling off to form entirely new parties. Compounding the challenges
were the weak ideological attachments of centrist/populist parties and all parties’
unwillingness to support the government.42
By the turn of the new millennium, civilians were voicing their desire to take the
“historic and courageous step” of eliminating the military’s levy, which promised to
“make military expenditures transparent for the ﬁrst time” as well as make it possible to
focus more on the national priority of “education, health, and social projects.”43 In
opposition, the armed forces chiefs argued that preserving the levy would avoid what
they called the politicization of the military budget. The stage was set for debilitating
extralegal clashes.
In December 1999, against the wishes of the Congress and the military high
command, Democracia Popular (DP) President Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000) let the
second levy provision expire and proposed military budget cuts and IMF-styled
adjustments. Mahuad had failed to remove the levy in late 1998 after confronting a
stalwart Congress. This time, resultant protests grew and climaxed in Mahuad’s ouster
when a faction of junior ofﬁcers led by Colonel Lucio Gutie´rrez, citing the levy’s end as
a reason for acting, joined with indigenous protesters to overthrow Mahuad and institute
a junta headed by Gutie´rrez.44 Chief of the Military High Command General Carlos
Mendoza, unable to accept the junta or military rule and aware of mounting
international criticism and threats of sanctions, dissolved the junta and installed Vice
President Gustavo Noboa.45 The military then got its oil money, and more: President
Noboa (2000–2003) issued a decree reimbursing the military 150 million USD for
royalties lost under the expired provision, even though the military had only earned 80
million USD under it in 1998.46
In November 2000, Noboa introduced a bill to permanently replace the second
provision of the military levy in full. The Congressional Economic Committee reacted
by advancing its own plan whereby 45 percent of the royalties from PETROECUADOR
would go to the military through 2003, with no possibility for renewal,47 a sign of the
changing context. First, leftist parties had increasingly positioned themselves in
opposition to the military’s economic privileges. Second, constitutional change in 1998
had abolished discretionary funds for the defense minister and other ministers, diluting
the military’s ability to deliver patronage to members of legislative committees. Finally,
the military’s standing had diminished and coercion had become less viable after the
coup in December 2000.48 Consequently, the bill’s main sponsor, Vice President of the
Congress Antonio Posso of the indigenous-led leftist Movimiento de Unidad
Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), could leverage the strength to prevail upon the
Executive, and the bill was approved. Noboa, with no party supporters, relented and
signed it.49
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Still, the levy had not been defeated. The ﬁrst provision remained intact, and in the
mid-2000s the tax kept generating tens of millions of dollars annually.50 As it would not
elapse, those who would curtail it would need to alter the statute, or pass a law
dismantling military levies entirely. Noboa was unlikely to support either, however.
Further, the pre-existing will in Congress to pursue radical reform was limited.
Altogether, toppling the levy would require creating a coalition pro-actively assembled
to dismantle that remote legal structure. These developments were not far off.
In the mid-2000s, several changes in the political environment further weakened
the military within government corridors. Naturally, Noboa’s military heir—Partido
Sociedad Patrio´tica (PSP) former coup leader Lucio Gutie´rrez (2003–2005)—left the
military levy intact. Gradually, Gutie´rrez’s civilian successors were less lenient. The
interim independent President Alfredo Palacio (2005–2007) did not target the levy.51
Socialist Alianza PAIS (AP) President Rafael Correa (2007–2017) did, ﬁrst by
appointing Ecuador’s ﬁrst civilian defense minister, Guadalupe Larriva.52 Her second in
command, the vice-minister of defense, held a post also reserved for civilians only, and
the minister’s role shifted from advisor to executor of decisions and strategies.53 Now
the military no longer had the advocates in the cabinet that it had before when the
defense portfolio was reserved for the highest-ranking ofﬁcer.
Correa, who vowed to terminate levies and spend the savings on social programs,
then secured approval to convene an assembly to rewrite the constitution. The military
responded by looking to elicit some last-minute legislative support prior to the 2007
Constituent Assembly. It hoped to draw out the cooperation of the PSP, which Gutie´rrez
and sectors of the military had founded. Since PSP was expected to trail AP—which
itself was unlikely to get a majority—the military also tried to align themselves with
other parties. Yet the die had been cast. Years of honing its autonomy left the military
with weak, if any, pre-existing party sympathies. Also, the PSP’s own relations had
collapsed. During Gutie´rrez’s term, the party had allied with both indigenous-led
socialist and conservative parties, but antagonisms tore the axes apart and Gutie´rrez’s
former supporters united to impeach him.54 Thus, the military’s efforts were too little,
too late; it could not educe legislative allies.
Meanwhile, a coalition of indigenous and socialist leaders desirous of levy reform
emerged. Before the 2007 Constituent Assembly election, many candidates defected
from the Pachakutik Party—which had allied with the PSP before and after the 2002
election—to join Correa’s AP. The coalition then won a majority (versus PSP’s 7
percent) of seats, giving the bloc the power to dismiss Congress and assume legislative
functions for the duration of the Assembly. The loose and diverse cast was hard to hold
together, but Correa managed due to the ideological afﬁnity among the coalition’s
socialist partners and his ability to centralize decision-making and issue instructions.55
Equally critical to the success of the coalition was the election of reputable economist,
and Correa’s former Energy Minister, Alberto Acosta of the AP as Assembly President.
Acosta set out “to construct a truly democratic society, underscored with the values of
freedom, equality, and responsibility” in which “economic rationality would be
reconciled with ethics and common sense.”56 Acosta’s message resonated with
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indigenous leaders who imagined collective control over land and natural resources and
whose support was critical to hold the coalition together. While the military seemed
isolated, a new strength poised Correa and allies to annihilate the system of oil rents that
since 1970 had let predatory interests plunder Ecuador’s resource wealth.
In April 2008, the Assembly approved a law suppressing all oil funds, ﬁscal rules,
and revenue earmarks. The Assembly then wrote oil levies out of the draft constitution,
which was approved by the body in July 2008 and by voters with a 64 percent to 28
percent margin in September 2008. “The old structures are defeated,” Correa declared.57
Correa attributed the historic victory to the ascendency of the coalition he assembled,
saying: “If we wanted to change Ecuador, we had to win political power.”58
Chile
As of 2017, leaders in Chile had not successfully repealed the 1958 Copper Law, which
forces the state copper company, Codelco, to turn over 10 percent of its annual export
earnings to the military. When Chile transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in 1990,
it seemed as if the armed forces held all the cards. The military, under General Pinochet’s
leadership, had left ofﬁce strong, conﬁdent, and united. The military engineered a transition
aimed at securing prerogatives and curbing the powers of the incoming democratic
administration. The democratic government could not assert a stronger role in human
rights, the management of defense policy, or military affairs because the military held
tutelary-like powers. Claudio Fuentes summed up the balance of civil-military power this
way: “If there is a country in which it seems almost impossible to develop civilian policies
on military affairs, given the legacy of inherited legal constraints, that country is Chile.”59
During and after the restoration of democracy, the military equipped itself with civilian
party allies. Its legislative bulwark was Democracia y Progreso (Democracy and
Progress)—an alliance of the rightwing parties Renovacio´n Nacional (RN), Unio´n
Demo´crata Independiente (UDI), and the smaller Unio´n de Centro (UCC). Together, the
rightwing parties had organized the “Yes” campaign during the plebiscite of 1988 held to
determine whether Chile’s ruling president, General Augusto Pinochet, should extend his rule
for another eight years. The parties would continue to closely identify with the military and
outgoing Pinochet government.60 Democracia y Progreso eventually became Alianza por
Chile. Alianza was no less a stalwart proponent of preserving military economic interests.
Meanwhile, on the civilian side, the political axis centered on the Concertacio´n de
los Partidos por la Democracia (Coordination of Parties for Democracy), an alliance of
center-left political parties originally formed to organize the “No” campaign during the
plebiscite. This coalition included primarily the Demo´crata Cristiano (DC) party and
the left bloc consisting of the Partido Socialista de Chile (PS) and the Partido por la
Democracia (PPD).61 Practically from its inception, the Concertacio´n’s platform
included a call for reform of the Copper Law. In its view, dispensing with the military’s
punitive copper levy was essential to modernizing the state and economy. For twenty
years, one Concertacio´n administration after the next would ﬂoat legislative proposals
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designed to defeat the Copper Law. Each time, the civilian party coalition would either
withdraw those proposals in anticipation of congressional defeat or submit bills that
would fall short of the votes needed for passage.
Like his predecessors, President Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) pledged to terminate
the military’s levy, and in July 2000, offered a constitutional amendment to abandon the
Copper Law wholesale and substitute a new system for military procurement.62 This
was as part of a much more ambitious, comprehensive set of proposed amendments to
the Magna Carta designed to eliminate the authoritarian enclaves left over from the
dictatorship. These amendments would not stand a chance of passing without support
from the Alianza, since the seats held by the Concertacio´n in the Senate always fell
short of the qualiﬁed majorities necessary to pass constitutional reforms (see Table 1).
The Copper Law required qualiﬁed majorities of four sevenths (57 percent) to change.63
If the past were any guide, the military’s political strength would again exhibit itself in
the congress, resulting in certain defeats for the proposals.
However, by the end of the twentieth century, judicial events both abroad and at
home and electoral calculations of political parties combined to alter the civil-military
balance of power. Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 on charges of gross
violations of human rights, and he returned to Chile in 2000 mired in public disgrace.
This constituted a watershed moment, not only for Chile’s human rights policies but
civil-military relations, in general. The European judicial action catalyzed change in
Chile by deﬂating Pinochet’s stature, which in turn reduced the military’s political
Table 1 Civilian and Military Coalitional Strength in Chile, 1990–2014
Deputies Senators
Coalition Year (n) % QM(1) (n)(2) % QM(1)
Concertacio´n 1990 69 57.50 -1 22 57.89 0
1994 69 57.50 -1 21 55.27 1
1998 70 58.3 -2 20 52.63 2
2002 62 51.67 6 20 52.64 2
2006 65 54.17 3 20 52.64 2
2010 57 47.50 11 20 52.64 2
2014 67 55.84 1 21 55.27 1
Alianza 1990 48 40.00 5 16 42.10 1
1994 45 37.50 8 15 39.47 2
1998 47 39.17 6 17 44.73 0
2002 57 47.50 -4 17 44.73 0
2006 54 45.00 -1 17 44.73 0
2010 58 48.33 -5 17 44.73 0
2014 49 40.83 4 16 42.11 -1
(1) QM stands for qualiﬁed majority. For Concertacio´n it is the number of votes needed to achieve 4/7th
majority threshold necessary for passage (68/120 in Chamber, 22/38 in Senate); QM for Alianza is the
number of votes needed to block formation of 4/7th qualiﬁed majority (53/120 in Chamber, 17/38 in Senate).
(2) From 1990 to 2006, 8 appointed “bionic” senators as well as former heads of state held senate seats.
Source: Authors compiled data from Servicio Electoral de Chile.
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power and placed it on the defensive.64 Meanwhile, political parties of the right were
coming around to the realization that unless they began to put some distance between
themselves and Pinochet’s armed forces, they would never attract the more moderate
Chilean voters whose support was vital if they were ever to become viable contenders
for the presidency. Their electoral calculations prompted them to collaborate with
Concertacio´n to amend the 1980 constitution in ways that would solidify civilian
control over the armed forces. Early in Lagos’s term, the Concertacio´n and Alianza
coalitions each agreed to submit bills to eliminate most of the authoritarian legacies still
embedded in the constitution. 65 These moves were seen by Alianza as remedies to its
own retrograde, authoritarian image. Finally, on September 22, 2005, the constitutional
amendments became law.
However, while the Alianza demonstrated a willingness to team up with
Concertacio´n to eliminate the constitutional military enclaves of power, it showed no
such willingness when it came to scrapping the Copper Law. Why? The military natural
resource levy spared the conservative political parties of the need to publicly justify huge
levels of military spending.66 The levy constituted an automatic transfer of copper export
revenues from Codelco into military coffers that was hidden from public view, and that
did not require congressional deliberation, scrutiny, or oversight. As a result, the military
had been the annual recipient of hundreds of millions USD.67 In the absence of the copper
levy, the military’s considerable ﬁnancial shortfall would have to be compensated—either
in whole or in part—through another funding mechanism undoubtedly tied to the national
budget, which would set off a congressional debate about competing budgetary
priorities,68 forcing the Alianza parties to publicly defend either of two unpalatable
remedies: huge tax increases to cover the shortfall or a sizeable redistribution of funds
from social welfare, health, education, etc. to defense. Politically, that would have been
costly for the Alianza parties, and so they continued to support the Copper Law, even as
they moved decisively off their hardline, pro-military position on other issues.69
For their part, the armed forces have been wary of subjecting defense expenditure
decisions to annual congressional budget deliberations. They fear their revenues will be
held hostage to what they deemed to be the narrow interests and misinformed views of
legislators. Defense requires long-term planning and multi-year funding so that
strategies can always be fulﬁlled even when politics complicates matters in the interim.
The military does not trust the government to balance long-term defense needs with
short-term social spending priorities. Accordingly, in 2009, when President Bachelet
submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a bill to repeal and replace the Copper Law, the
military objected. While the bill did call for twelve-year strategic plans and multi-year
budgeting schemes, it did not go far enough, as far as the armed forces were concerned.
It did not establish a funding ﬂoor, nor a binding commitment to four-year funding,
instead subjecting defense to an annual discussion and reassessment, alongside all the
other components of the national budget.70 In this manner, defense could conceivably
still get cut and long-term plans jeopardized in favor of social expenditures which reap
powerful, short-term political dividends for congressmen. The Alianza coalition agreed
with its military partner,71 and ultimately the bill languished, never to be voted on.
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It would not have been expected that the Alianza Government of Sebastia´n Pin˜era
(2010–2013) would take up the cause of dismantling the Copper Law, but in 2012,
President Pin˜era submitted a bill that incorporated many of the same features found in
Bachelet’s 2009 bill, as well as new ones, including a role for the Congress in debates
over strategic capabilities for defense. The context and incentives had begun to change.
During the boom in copper and commodities, Codelco’s payments to the military
swelled to 1.2, 1.3, and 1.6 billion USD in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively.72 These
staggering transfers abetted Codelco’s mounting debts and a war chest for the military
valued in 2012 at an estimated 4 billion USD.73 Many wondered why the military
should reap such a windfall, when other priorities were under-funded. Moreover, a spate
of corruption allegations was surfacing, involving military ofﬁcers, copper funds, and
dubious purchases.74 Defeating the Copper Law would mean a victory for transparency,
making surreptitious ﬁnancial transactions less likely. Pin˜era’s bill sailed through the
Chamber of Deputies, garnering ninety-one votes, twenty-three more than needed to
satisfy supermajority requirements.75 In the end, the rightwing Alianza senators parted
company with both their president and their peers in the Chamber. They came out
against the reform bill,76 refusing to put it to a vote. Like so many military levy reform
efforts before it, the bill entered legislative purgatory.
To date, the copper levy remains the law of the land in Chile, and it is quite possible that
any bill introduced to reform or defeat it will meet the same fate as all those that have come
before. The levy has, however, in recent years, survived by a hair’s width, and while the
military’s coalition has held together, it is showing signs of fraying. Lawmakers from both
coalitions are growing frustrated with the military’s ﬁnancing schemes and are concerned
with Codelco’s precarious ﬁnancial state, as the ﬁrm ﬁnds itself squeezed by falling copper
prices at one end and military levy obligations and miners’ demands for higher wages at the
other end. As a result, the government has been forced to inject hundreds of millions in
capital (measured in USD) into Codelco77 to keep the ﬁrm stable and to fulﬁll the company’s
military levy duties. In the midst of these economic woes, investigators uncovered a
corruption plot dubbed “Milicogate,” alleging that a group of ofﬁcers absconded with funds
from the Copper Law to contract for services (to repair military vehicles) between 2011 and
2013, which never took place.78 The scandal re-launched an effort to start up congressional
discussions on repealing the Copper Law. In May of 2016, the congress passed a measure
making the Copper Law transparent for the ﬁrst time in its history.79
Repeated attempts at reform may reﬂect civilian beliefs that not too many
additional lawmakers need to be won over to their side. From that perspective, the
introduction of reform bills represented a deliberate strategy designed not in ignorance
of the power differential, but in response to its potential openings.
Alternative Explanation: Inter-State Rivalries and Dispute Resolution
It was mentioned previously that the large and undisclosed nature of natural resource
tax transfers made to the military designed to facilitate arms purchases can create
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uncertainty among rival states. That, in turn, could lead to border disputes, even
hostilities. In fact, some scholars argue that those border tensions give rise to military
levies as effective mechanisms used to project greater military capacity and instill
even greater uncertainty among rivals.80 If that is so, then once border disputes are
resolved, and geo-political tensions abated, the justiﬁcation for those taxes should
weaken, and their defeat made easier. Was that in fact the case with Ecuador and
Chile?
In Ecuador, the military levy was justiﬁed from the start based on the country’s
longstanding border dispute with Peru. The two nations fought a war in July 1941 over
contested territory that ended with a ceaseﬁre and the signing of the Rio Protocol in
January 1942. Nonetheless, the row was rekindled when Ecuador declared the treaty
null and void, alleging that it had been signed under duress, when foreign troops
occupied Ecuadorian soil. This position was resurrected by future governments who
argued that the dispute posed grave dangers to the republic and helped to validate two
secret laws in 1965 and 1970 that together allocated half of the state’s oil royalty income
to the military for arms purchases. Indeed, in the text of the 1970 law allotting 30
percent of royalties to the military, President Jose´ Marı´a Velasco Ibarra said the measure
was needed to "protect and defend the nation’s sovereignty."81 Security justiﬁcations
gained still more traction when tensions with Peru erupted into the Cenepa War of
1995.82 Yet, despite a deﬁnitive peace agreement and border demarcation between the
two nations reached in 1998, the military levy persisted. It was another ten years before
the tax was ﬁnally defeated.
The Chilean Copper Law grew out of geopolitical disputes between Chile and
Argentina regarding sovereignty over a set of islands within the Beagle Channel. In
1958, Chile constructed a navigational beacon on one of these islands, the Snipe,
which the Argentines then destroyed, replacing it with one of their own, only to
have that dismantled by the Chileans. The Argentines sent a destroyer which
landed eighty marines on the island, triggering the deployment of Chilean naval
vessels, as the two countries came close to blows. The crisis (but not the lingering
geopolitical dispute) was temporarily resolved but not before the government of
Carlos Iban˜ez enacted the Copper Law to raise funds to enlarge the Chilean ﬂeet to
better cope with future naval encounters with Argentina. The conﬂict was
permanently resolved with the 1984 signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship
between Argentina and Chile. The Treaty drew maritime boundaries which left the
disputed Beagle islands (including Snipe) in Chilean hands. Despite the fact that
the dispute which gave rise to the Copper Law has been settled, that Law remains in
force.83
The inter-state rivalry explanation for the fate of military levies does not
measure up to the evidence. The dispute resolutions would have suggested levy
reforms in both countries. In Chile, it has not occurred, and the timing of reform in
Ecuador suggests that the inter-state dispute resolution with Peru had nothing to do
with it.
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Conclusion
This study has shown that the fate of natural resource levy reform rests with the
outcomes of legislative coalitional battles between civilian and military allies. The
comparative case analysis reveals the importance of differences in coalitional
strength—ones which stand out against a background of commonalities between
Ecuador and Chile. These are nations whose militaries both emerged from authoritarian
rule strengthened and able to exert considerable inﬂuence over the transition to
democracy. They both retained large natural resource rents and lavish budgets in
economies reliant on mineral production and exports, but these militaries differed
appreciably in their ability to defend their natural resource rents.
In Ecuador, the military erred in not taking coalition formation seriously enough after
leaving ofﬁce in 1979. Instead, it had put its faith in its own institutional, coercive power,
the fact that the defense cabinet portfolio had been reserved for military ofﬁcers alone, and
the historical difﬁculties civilians had in forging their own coalitions in a fragmented
multi-party system. These proved to be miscalculations, as President Correa appointed
Ecuador’s ﬁrst civilian defense minister in 2007, stitched together a new, more
ideologically coherent coalition centered around his AP Party, and earned a majority vote
in the constituent assembly. All their historic institutional power and autonomy could not
compensate for the fact that the armed forces lacked legislative allies with which to
compete against Correa’s coalition. Thus, they could only watch from the sidelines as the
AP-led coalition within the constituent assembly eliminated the oil levy.
In Chile, by contrast, the military understood early on the importance of having
party allies. The rightist Alianza coalition was ideologically coherent and generally held
together well through the years of democratic rule as it did legislative battle with the
center-left coalition Concertacio´n. However, the military’s institutional power would
weaken with continued revelations of human rights abuses at the hands of the former
military regime, Pinochet’s own legal predicaments, and electoral calculations made by
the Alianza parties that convinced them that compromise with the Concertacio´n on
some issues might be advantageous. Ironically, those same electoral calculations drove
them to defend the military and its levy, to avoid a politically costly, public defense of
exorbitant military expenditures within the congress.
The results suggest that, regarding post-authoritarian civil-military power relations,
coalitional dynamics are central. Relations are not immutable, even in countries with
politically potent armed forces once capable of intimidating their opponents. A
military’s leverage and political power can be weakened by depriving it of off-budget
natural resource revenues when civilians are determined to forge coalitions among like-
minded legislative political parties. With those coalitions in place, civilians can force
unwanted change upon their military subjects who, conﬁned to the same democratic
institutions and rules of the game as their opponents, must accept the outcome.
Further investigation beyond these countries is warranted. Generalizations about
the impact of legislative coalitions on military interests and behavior cannot be made
based on this two-nation comparative, process-tracing study. The results, however
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suggestive, do open fruitful lines of inquiry into a topic that has received scant attention
in the past. Because many resource-rich post-authoritarian states, across several
continents, make compulsory contributions to military coffers from mineral export
revenues, it would be fruitful to analyze how and whether levies were either sustained,
reduced, or annulled through coalitional politics. A wider cross-national, cross-regional
study could generate ﬁrmer conclusions, with important implications for civilian
control, social redistribution, economic development, and security.
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